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On December 17, 1996, the Treasury Department is
sued final regulations under section 7701 of the Inter
nal Revenue Code implementing the regime dubbed
"check-the-box,• under which taxpayers can elect to be
treated as corporations or as passthrough entities for
U.S.tax purposes. The pwpose of this article is to argue
that the adoption of these regulations affords a momen
tous opportunity for Congress to achieve significant
simplification ofthe notoriously complex U.S. interna
tional tax rules.Fundamentally, the adoption of check
the-box means that U.S. taxpayers will be able to elect
whether or not their foreign-source active income will
enjoy deferral from current U.S. taxation. This adop
tion of completely elective deferral, in tum, implies
that one argument frequently made against the man
datory abolition of deferral - that it will be a major
revenue loser - is unlikely to be true. Thus, the adop
tion of check-the-box provides an opportunity for Con
gress to go one step further and abolish deferral on a
mandatory, nonelective basis, which in tum would
have significant potential for simplification.
TAX NOTES, January 13, 1197

The check-the-box regulations have been reviewed
extensively elsewhere, and therefore only a brief sum
mary of their main points, as applied to foreign entities,
will be given here.1 Under the regulations, a foreign
entity can be one of two things: a per se corporation,
i.e., an entity treated automatically as a corporation, or
an "eligible entity,• i.e., an entity that can elect to be
treated as either a corporation or as a passthrough
entity (a branch or a partnership).2 Foreign per se cor
porations are simply listed in the proposed regulations;
in each of 80 countries, one or two forms of legal en
tities are considt?red per se corporations.3 All other
foreign entities are eligible entities and can elect to be
treated as a partnership (if they have at least two
partners), as a branch (if wholly owned), or as a cor
poration.' In the absence of an explicit election, foreign
entities will be classified under the default rule as
partnerships or branches if any member has personal
liability for the debts of the entity, and as orporations
if no member has such liabillty.5
As has been stated elsewhere, these regulations have
very significant implications for the international tax
rules of the United States.' The most important of these
implications is that, as Michael Schier pointed out, the
check-the-box regulations mean the end of deferral but on an elective basis, i.e., only for those foreign
1
s«, e.g., Seto, Wieclcm, and Siegel, "Foreign Entity aas
sification Proposed Regulations Issued - Waiting To Exhale,"
Tu Notes Int'l, May XI, 1996, p.1727; S:ltler, "Initial Thoughts
on the Proposed 'Checlc the Box' Regulations," Tu Notes, June
17, 1996, p. 167'9; Blanco and Doemberg, "What One Hand
Giveth, the Other Taketh Away: The Proposed Check-the-Box
Regulations and the Proposed Section 1441 Regulations," Tu
Notes Int'l, Aug. 19, 1996, p. 615; Conlon, "Streamlining the
U.S. Check-the-Box Regulations for the Foreign Corporation,"
Tax Notes lnt'l, Oct. 21, 1996, p.13 77.
Z'freas. reg. section 301.7701-2(b)(B), -3(a), (b)(2).
'Treas. reg. section 301. 7701-2(b)(B) .
f'J'reas. reg. section 301.7701-3(a) .
'Treas. reg. section 301. 7701-3(b)(2).
"These implications are discussed in Schier, supra note 1;
set also New York State Bar Association Tax Section Report
on the "Check-the-Box" Classification System Proposed in
No tice 95-14 ("NY SBA report"), 95 TNT 173-67.
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entities for which the taxpayer d\009eS to end lt.7 (A
taxpayer cannot choose passthrough status for the
enumerated per ee corporations, but it can avoid using
that type of vehicle.)

Th• t:IHH:k-tlltl-box lfll/Ulatlon• 111Mn

••I.,

th• •nd of dllftlrral - but on •n
111«:tlve
l.11., only for thOMI
forell/n 11nlltl11• for which 1h11 tap•y11r

t:hoo•• to 1111d It

engaged in an active trade or business for purposes of section 355.
On the other hand, the taxpayer will likely elect
corporate status (or use a per se corporation) in the
following situations: 10
• to achieve deferral of foreign-source active income that cannot be sheltered by ~~ .
..
•
to avoid deemed terminations of a partnership
under section 708 and deemed reconmbutions of
assets to a new partnership subject to section
1491;

•

The following is a partial list of those situations in

which taxpayers would likely opt for ending deferral
by using a foreign eligible entity and electing
passthrough status:'
• when the foreign entity is expected to generate
losses, which can be deducted on a current basis;'
•
to obtain direct foreign tax credits under section
901 and avoid the requirements for the indirect
credit under section 902 (corporate status of the
shareholder and 10 percent ownership);
• to avoid the separate basket for •noncontrolled
section 902 corporations• (i.e., corporations that
are more than 10 percent US.-owned, but are not
CFCs, such as a 50/50 joint venture);
•
to avoid the three-tier limitation of the indirect
credit (by electing passthrough status for fourthand lower-tier entities);
•
to avoid subpart F inclusions for dividend income from unrelated foreign entities that conduct an active business;
• to ensure look-through treatment for purposes
of the PFIC rules for less-than-25-percent-owned
foreign entities, and to achieve look-through
treatment for any related entities for purposes of
the foreign personal holding company (FPHC)
rules;
•
to achieve a more favorable allocation of interest
expense by directly including the assets and
liabilities of the foreign entity in the consolidated
computation required under section 864(e);
•
to avoid U.S. withholding tax for foreign entities
that receive U.S.-source payments;
•
to avoid the application of section 367 to outbound transfers to the foreign entity (section
1491 would apply to transfers to a partnership,
but not to a branch); and
• to ensure look-through treatment for purposes
of determining whether a U.S. corporation is

7Schler, supr11 note 1.
'This list is based on Schler and the NYSBA report, s,q,r11
notes 1 and 6, respectively.
'If the entity is expected to generate losses at first, but
later gains, the taxpayer may not want to choose passthrough
treatment because it would be difficult to convert the entity
into a a>rporation without being subject to tax under section
367. On the other hand, it would be easier to oonvert a corporation into a branch without incurring a tax under sections
367 or 1491.
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when foreign members of the entity wish to
avoid being engaged in a U.S. trade or business;
• to avoid U.S. withholding tax on interest payments made by the entity; and
• to enable the entity to be a party to a tax-free
reorganization under section 368. In addition,
there may be further advantages under foreign
tax laws from using hybrid entities, i.e., entities
treated as, for example, branches under checlcthe-box but as corporations by the foreign jurisdiction.11
Despite these significant advantages for taxpayers,
check-the-box is definitely a step in the right direction,
because, as the New York State Bar Association Tax
Section pointed out, when the system was first
proposed but its application to foreign entities was in
doubt, the same result can almost always be achieved
under current law, but with more complexity and transaction costs.12 Thus, check-the-box makes it possible
for taxpayers to avoid transaction costs, without putting the IRS in a significantly worse position than it
was under prior law, and also reduces the likelihood
that classification issues will be the subject of litigation,
which is costly for both taxpaye.r s and tl;e IRS.
Revenue Implications of Check-the-Box

- .What are the implications of the adoption of checkthe-box for the debate on whether the United States
should eliminate deferral? Perhaps the mostrrominent
recent argument against repealinj deferra is that it
would be a major revenue loser.1 Naturally, this is a
compelling argument in our deficit-<.onsdous era,
when any revenue loser must be offset by revenue

"Schier and the NYSBA report, supr11 notes 1 and 6, respectively.
11 ld. 1be preamble to the ftnal regulations envisages that
Treasury and the IRS •will a>ntinue to monitor carefully- the
use of hybrids in the international context. As Schler points
out, some o.f the worst potential abuses (identified in the
NYSBA report) have been addressed by the proposed withholding regulations (see prop. reg. sections 1.1441-1 and -6).
On the interaction between check-the-box and withholding
regulations, see also Blanco and Doemberg, supr11 note 2.
12 NYSBA report, supra note 6.
0 Stt Frisch, supr11 note 4; Ault, •Toe International Tax
Policy Challenges Facing President-Elect Clinton,.. T11x Notes
lnt'I, Nov. 16, 1992, p. 1021; Oosterhuis and Cutrone, "TIie
Cost of Deferral's Repeal: If Done Properly, It Loses Billions,..
Tu Notes, Feb. 8, 1993, p. 765.
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nllen, and revenue raJsen (i.e., tax Increases) are very
hard to enact.

Even if thla argument were empirically correct when
made (and ac,me doubts can be rai9ed on that score),"
the cbeclt-the-box regulations tend to largely eliminate
iL II The following axiom la a useful one for legislators
to memome: Alf d«tiw ~ in the ta In, tm
fflJfflW lo,m. 'lhla axiom la true because taxpayers
would not make the election unless they stood to benefit from i~ i.e., pay lea tax; only the rare taxpayer
would make an election that raises its taxes. Since
check-the-box la elec:tive, it is a revenue loser. Thus,
with check-the-box in place, the argument that repealing deferral is a revenue loser loses much of its force,
bec:aU9e taxpayers would choose to check the box and
end deferral in all situations in which doing so would
reduce their tax liabllity. 16

I

All eltJCll"'1 provl•lon• In 1h11 tax law

a,w IWvtlfllltl I06tlrtl.

It could be argued that a mandatory end to deferral
would be a revenue loser even with check-the-box in
place, because taxpayers still would not be able to
check the box for the per se corporations, and many of
their current subsidiaries would fall under that category. However, over time taxpayers are likely to
respond to check-the-box by using foreign entities that
are not on the per se corporations list to achieve current
inclusion whenever the tax implications were
favorable, and their ability to do so with confidence
that they would not be challenged by the IRS has increased by the promulgation of the checlc-the-box regulations. On the other hand, a mandatory end to deferral would result in current inclusion in all those cases

HAI the NYSBA report on check-the-box makes dear, taxpayers can achieve the same result under current law in most
situations. If that is the case, check-the-box is not a significant
revenue loser, and therefore ending deferral before chedt-thebox could not be a ligniftcant revenue lOlel' because taxpayen
would, under previous law, achieve the elective end of deferral if they could reduc:e their tax liability u a resull
"Treas. reg. sections 301.7701-1, -2 and -3 (Dec. 17, 1996).
"Frisch argues that ending deferral would be a revenue
loser because of the favorable implications for allocating interest expense, i.e., that multinationals would be able to include the assets of their subsidiaries (rather than their stock)
and their borrowings in the allocation and the net result
would be more interest expense allocated to the United
Stales. However, taxpayen are likely to structure their operations to achieve this favorable result under check-the-box.
which. over time, a>uld apply to most entities abroad (those
that are not per 1e corporations); and the inclusion of the
borrowings of foreign subsidiaries in a formula that assumes
that all interest expense is fungible is correct as a tax policy
matter:
there is no policy rationale for allocating all foreign
interest expense against foreign-source income. Surely
it would be a good thing to be able to get rid of the
CFC netting rule, one of the more infamous exercises
in complexity in the U.S. international tax regime!

TAX NOTES, January 13, 1997

when taxpayers would elect deferral under check-thebox. Thus, it seems highly unlllcely that a mandatory
end to deferral would be a revenue loser with checkthe-box in place.17

Slmpllftcation Potential of Ending Defenal
Bven if ending deferral is not a revenue· loser, that ·
does not nec:essarily mean that it is correct as a matter
of tax policy. Should deferral continue to be available
on an elective basis, u implied by check-the-box?
The arguments for and against ending deferral have
~ going on for over 30 years, and by now are getting
somewhat stale.11 The Kennedy, Nixon, Ford, and
Carter administrations all proposed to end deferral
(either completely or partially), at least for U.S.-based
multinationals, by imposing current taxation on the
earnings of foreign corporations controlled by U.S.
shareholden. Most recently, the partial termination of
deferral was included in the "runaway plant" legislation introduced by Sen. Byron Dorgan, D-N.D.19
As Dan Frisch has pointed out, the arguments for
and against deferral have an unrealistic ring in today's
world because (as explained below) they depend on
notions of capital-export versus capital-import
neutrality, which in turn assume that multinationals
play a major part in the efficient allocation of income
on a global basis. However, with the dramatic increase
in international portfolio investment in the past 15
years, multinationals are not as central players in this
area as they used to be. Moreover, other issues, such
as the proper allocation of interest expense, have come
to dominate the tax planning of multinationals much
more than achieving deferral per se.20
This article does not attempt to rehash the old debate
among the economists, which is unlikely to be settled
ever. Instead, it focuses on one major advantage of
ending deferral, which has not been sufficiently
stressed in the debate: its simplification potential In
fact, the 30-plU&-years-long debate over deferral has
contributed significantly to the complexity of the U.S.
international tax regime. The story is well known, and
is only briefly summarized here. Congress was recep-

''The repeal of deferral is generally viewed as a revenue
gainer; deferral for CFCs is scored u a tax expenditure costing
$1.7 billion in the most recent tax expenditure budget.
11 For the history of the deferral debate, see generally Hufbauer, U.S. Tuation of International Income: Blueprint for
Reform (Institute for International Economics, 1992); Joint
Committee on Taxation, "'Facton Affecting the International
Competitiveness of the United States• OCS-6-91), 232-258.
"American Jobs Act of 1996, section 1597; for the debate
surrounding this provision, see Gravelle, "Foreign Tax Provisions of the American Jobs Act of 1996," lb Notes, Aug. 26,
1996, p. 1165; Merrill and Donahoo, "'Runaway Plant' Legislation: Rhetoric and Reality," Tax Notes, July 8, 1996, p. 221.
The last attempt to aboliah deferral altogether was in 1992;
see JCT, Explanation of H.R. 5270 (Foreign Income Tax
Rationalization and Simplification Act of 1992) 30 OCS 11-92;
May 29, 1992).
:!Oprisch, "The Economics of Intematioruil Tax Policy: Some
Old and New Approaches," Tax Notes, Apr. 30, 1990, p. 581.
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tive to the arguments in favor of ending deferral, which
were made in the name of capital-export neutrality, i.e.,
the notion that taxes should not influence taxpayers'
decision to invest at home or abroad, and that deferral
operates u a tax subsidy for foreip _investment.21
Howe\ er, Congresa, under heavy lobbying from U.S.buecl multinationals, was unwilling to eliminate deferral altogether, because of the capital-import neutrality
argument: as long u other countries do not impose tax
on the foreign eamlngs of their multinationals, it was
said, ending deferral would hinder the competitiveneu of U.S. multinationals because income earned by
their subsidiaries in low-tax countries would be subject
to current U.S. tax, whereas income earned in the same
jurisdictions by subsidiaries of foreign multinationals
would not be subject to current taxation by the home
country of the foreign multinational.22

I

Tht1 IHHld to dl•llngul•h •cllv11 from

1M••lv11 lnCOIIIII h•• m11•nt that th11
•nll-d11t.rral reg/m11• an, much mon,
comp/11x th•n th11y ntllld to IHI.

As a result of these arguments, a compromise has
emerged, which looks like the proverbial horse designed by a committee (i.e., a camel). Since 1937, we
have seen the enactment of no less than five anti-deferral regimes, which have successively narrowed the
scope of deferral permitted to U.S. taxpayers. These
regimes, each with its own acronym, are the personal
holding company (PHC) and foreign personal holding
company (FPHC) regimes (1937); the foreign investment company (FIC) regime (1962); the controlled
foreign corporation (CFC) or subpart F regime (1962);
and the passive foreign investment company (PFIC)
regime (1986).23 Each of these regimes was added to
narrow the scope of perceived loopholes in the earlier
versions: the PHC and FPHC regimes were enacted
because the accumulated earnings tax (which is even

21

Another argument frequently made in favor of ending

deferral is that it violates horizontal equity for taxpayer A to
enjoy deferral on foreign-source income while taxpayer B is

taxed currently on domestic-soun:e income. But this assumes
taxpayer B does not have the option of earning foreign-soun:e
income, an assumption that may have lost some of its force
with the growth of portfolio capital investing overseas by
individuals.
21 5« the summary of this llJ'3UDlent in Frisch, supra note

16; Ault and Bradford, Tuing International Income: An
Analysis of tlie U.S. System and Its Economic Premises
(Cambridge: N1mR. 1989). The flaw in this argument is that
multinationals with an excess aedit position in the genenl
basket can use low-taxed foreign-soun:e active income to
reduce their average foreign tax rate below the U.S. rate, and
therefore the additional foreign-source income is effectively
untaxed,Just as if the US. had an exemption system, even
without eferral. S« Avi-Yonah, "The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification," 74 Te.x. L. Rtv.
1301, 1327-28 (1996).
nsections 541-547 (PHC); 551-565 (FPHC); 124M7 (FIC);
951-960 (CFC); and 1291-1297 (PFIC).
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older, and potentially applies to foreign entities) could
not be easily imposed on foreign corporations; subpart
P was enacted because the PHC and PPHC regimes
apply only to foreign corporations controlled by five
or fewer U.S. individuals; and the PFIC regime was
enacted because the other regimes apply orily to corporations controlled by U.S. persons.
The compromise mentioned above is thal an these anti-deferral regimes apply only to •passiv.e• income;
active business income earned through foreign corporations is permitted to be deferred.24 The rationale for
this distinction is that the capital-import neutrality argument outlined above applies most forcefully to income earned from the active conduct of a trade or
business abroad, where competitiveness is a significant
issue, and because the capital-export neutrality argument for ending deferral applies most forcefully to
passive income, which can be easily earned anywhere.
However, the need to distinguish ctive from passive
income has meant that the anti-deferral regimes are
much more complex than they need to be.
The problem with this proliferation of anti-deferral
regimes is that, despite the existence of some ordering
rules, potentially they can all affect a U.S. taxpayer
with foreign-source income; thus, tax advisors have to
check each and every one for its potential application
whenever foreign-source income is earned. Each
regime is predictably complicated and riddled with
exceptions and modifications, which require many
hours of study. Although simplification has been
proposed many times, and there are currently proposals to reduce the number of applicable regimes to
two (subpart F and a new, consolidated passive foreign
corporation regime that combines PFIC and FPHC), it
is unclear when, if ever, it will be enacted, and to what
extent the burden on taxpayers will be lowered if it is. 25
Significant simplification, however, could be
achieved if deferral were to be abandoned completely.
In that case, all of the above regimes could be repealed
and replaced with look-through treatment for CFCs
(i.e., as under current law, foreign corporations that are
over SO percent controlled by 10 percent or larger U.S.
shareholders) and a unified regime for U.S. shareholders in foreign corporations that are not CFCs. The
justification for distinguishing the two regimes is that
in the case of CFCs, the U.S. shareholders (which
would be large) would have the necessary information
to include the earnings of the CFC in their income
currently. In general, most subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals would be CFCs, and most U.S. shareholders
in non-CFCs would be portfolio investors.

Hfhe exception is foreign base company income, which is
active income but nevertheless subject to subpart F because it
is subject to a low tax rate.
8 For a criticism of current simplification proposals u not
going far enough, see Tillinghast, "Foreign Provisions of the
Proposed Tax Simplification Act," Ta.x Notes, Nov_ 4, 1991, P611. 11\eSe proposals are the same as those currently under
consideration in Congress.
TAX NOTES, January 13, 1997
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The CFC regime would be much simpler than current subpart P, because there would be no need to
distinguish between most forms of active income
(eligible for deferral) and other forms of passive and
active income (such as forel_p base oompany sales income), which are not eligible for deferral. Thus, it
would be pcalble to repeal eections 952. 953, and 954
(dealing with the definition of subpart F income), since
all income of CFCs would be subject to current inclusion, as well as section 956 (the rule for investments
in U.S. property, which is not needed when all income
is currently included). These sections contain by far the
most complicated rules under subpart F, as well as
notorious traps for the unwary (such as the rule that
securing a bank loan of a U.S. parent with the stoclc of
its CFC triggers current inclusion under section 956).
The unified regime would replace all other antideferral regimes aimed mostly at portfolio investors.26
It would entail subjecting U.S. shareholders to current
taxation on their holdings in passive foreign entities
(defined similarly to PFICs) in one of two ways: on a
current inclusion of earnings basis, if the information
to do so were available (as it would typically be for
pure investment intermediaries); or on a notional, normal return on their investment, if the information were
not available.71 This regime also would be simpler than
the current regimes for individual shareholders, because there would be only one set of rules applicable
to small shareholders, and because the PFIC riales imposing interest on excess distributions, with all their
horrendous complexity, would be eliminated. Currently, a lot of effort is spent in trying to determine whether
foreign corporations are owned by five or fewer U.S.
individuals (and so may qualify as FPHCs), and a lot
of tax planning takes place to avoid the onerous PFIC
rules in particular. Under thejroposed regime, U.S.
~hareholders who invest abroa would be able to plan
m advance what the tax burden on this investment
would be, and it should be similar to their tax burden
on the normal return of a domestic investment, so as
to preserve capital-export neutrality.
The end of deferral also would mean the end of
many transfer pricing disputes involving U.S.-based
multinationals, because there would be no advantage
in shifting profits abroad if they were to be subject to
current U.S. taxation in any event (indeed, subpart F
can be viewed as a backstop to section 482). 28 While
there are some transfer pricing disputes involving
high-tax jurisdictions, in which the U.S. taxpayer is

»J owe this idea to Hugh Aull
Z7'Jbe distinction between passive and active foreign entities would still have to be maintained, because it is hard to
justify current taxation of an investment in Volkswagen when
an investment in General Moton enjoys deferral. One possible. alternative, which may be too complex, would be to
refrain from applying the regime when it can be shown that
the foreign entity (whether active or passive) bean a signifacant level of taxation.
-Toe original enactment of subpart F owed something to
the DuP_ont transfer pricing case, in which DuPont parked
most of its profits on European bales in a Swiss base company.

TAX NOTES, Januay 13, 1997

essentially a stakeholder, most recent transfer pricing
cases (including Surulstrrmd, Perkin-Elmer, and Nldioul
Sanianuhu:tor) involved tax-haven jurisdictions in
which transfer p ?I'S would not be a significant issue
without deferral.• Given the resoum!S employed by
the IRS lo combat transfer pricing and the oomplexlty
of the 482 regulations, any step in the direction of
reducing this burden would be a positive-on~. ·
··
Conclusion
The adoption of check-the-box offers an opportunity
for the new Congress to achieve significant simplification in the international tax rules of the United States.
Check-the-box means that deferral has become completely elective, and taxpayers will in the future choose
deferral only when it would reduce their taxes. Thus,
ending deferral will not be a significant revenue loser
compared to current law. On the positive side, ending
deferral offers the potential for extensive simplification
of the current international tax rules by (1) eliminating
the exclusions for various forms of active income from
subpart F; (2) extending a single anti-deferral regime
to passive income earned by U.S. shareholders through
foreign corporations that are not CFCs; and (3) significantly reducing the extent to which transfer pricing
by U.S.-based multinationals is a problem area for the
IRS.

Adoption of 1h11 chtH:k-th11-box
n,gu/atlon• off11r• an opportunity for
Congf'tlU to achltJVtl •lgnlllt;11nt
•lmp/Hlt:11tlon of thtJ notoriously
comp/11x U.S. lnttJrnatlonal tax rules.
Fundamentally, the issue of deferral is just one
aspect of the question of the appropriate tax treatment
of multinational enterprises. Ideally, multinationals
should be taxed primarily on a source basis, because
they do not have a truly meaningful tax residence.30
However, given that multinationals operate in jurisdictions in which they are subject to little or no taxation,
the alternatives are taxation by the country in which
the parent company is incorporated (the only country
that has jurisdiction to tax under internationally accepted standards), or no current taxation at all. The
latter alternative seems an unacceptable departure
from the principle that all income should be taxed once,
which underlies the efficient allocation of investment
in a world where positive tax rates are a necessity.
Thus, ending deferral seems like a step in the right

80ver the years, despite the lhetorical emphasis on foreigners abusing transfer pricing, most litigated transfer pricing c:ases invofved US. multinationals and tax havens, as a
list of some of the major cases (DuPont, U.S. St«l, Eli lilly,
Merck, Procter & Gnnble, Bousda & Lomb, etc.) makes clear. For
a fulle.r diacussion of these cases, see generally Avi-Yonah,
"The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the Evolution
of U.S. International Taxation.# 15 Vo. Tor Rn,. 89 (1995).
10See Avi-Yonah, supr11 note 22.
223
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direction. Moreover, Wee i ts elective version (chedt-the
box), a mandatory end to deferral is a further step
toward bringing the taxation of multinationals closer
to the way they operate u an economic reality - u
one entity traNciending jurildlctiooal boundaries. Por
U.S.-bued multinationifs, ending deferral means taxa
tion by the United States on a global basis u a con
lOlidated unit, jmt Wee their finanda1 statements are
prepared for presentation to the shareholders. Hope-

fully, the reaction of other developed countries would
be to follow suit, just Wee they did when 1Ubpart P was
enacted in 1962.
Por all these reasons, Congress would be making
significant progress towards a simpler international
tax regime, and one that is more
with �
nomic reality, if it acted not just to ra
the chedt-the.
box regime, but to end deferral u we
_ it
_ ·

2e

•

•

•

•

•
•
•
•

•
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